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[The Court] contents itself with abstractions and paraphrases of
abstractions, so that its opinion sounds much like a treatise
about cooking by someone who has never cooked before and has
no intention of starting now.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Summary judgment has long been the means of precluding a
case from going to trial where there exists no genuine issue of material fact.2 It plays an integral role in the scheme of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 Although much has been written on
1. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2521 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
2. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
3. "Summary judgment supplements dismissals under Rule 12, reinforces the good
faith pleading requirement of Rule 11, complements issue definition procedures under Rules
26(f) and (c) and Rule 16, and is congruent with both Rule 50(a) governing directed verdicts
and Rule 41(b) providing for dismissals." Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Fed-
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what constitutes a genuine issue of material fact,' one proposition
is well settled: "Notice, intent, motive and other states of mind are
common examples of historical facts established by inference. A
dispute over such an inference is an issue of fact even if the under-5
lying evidence itself is not in dispute, and it too is a jury issue."
The Advisory Committee also embraced this concept when amending Rule 56(e) in 1963. The Advisory Committee expressed grave
doubts about granting summary judgment in state of mind cases:
"Where an issue as to a material fact cannot be resolved without
observation of the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their
credibility, summary judgment is not appropriate." 6 The underlying premise is to assure that the factfinders view the witness and
draw their own inferences from her demeanor on the stand under
the pressure of cross-examination.'
The summary judgment inquiry has been concerned with general notions of whether there is a sufficient issue of fact to require
a trial. If there is a trial, the case may still be taken from the jury
after the close of the evidence if the judge directs a verdict. At
both procedural stages, the basic inquiry is one of whether a reasonable jury could find for either party. If it is possible for the jury
to find for either party, based on the evidence at a given stage,
then the case may proceed to the next stage. When the case is finally submitted to the jury, the triers of fact must ascertain
whether the plaintiff has satisfied her burden of proof. The burden
of proof is comprised of both the production burden and the persuasion burden. The production burden has generally been a
guidepost for the trial judge, while the persuasion burden has been
eral Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 465 (1984).
4. See generally id.
5. Id. at 470 (emphasis added). In Arnstein v. Porter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that:
[W]here, as here, credibility, including that of the defendant, is crucial, summary judgment becomes improper and a trial indispensible. It will not do, in
such a case, to say that, since the plaintiff, in the matter presented by his affidavits, has offered nothing which discredits the honesty of the defendant, the latter's deposition must be accepted as true. We think that Rule 56 was not
designed thus to foreclose plaintiff's privilege of examining defendant at a trial,
especially as to matters peculiarly within defendant's knowledge.
154 F.2d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1946). It should be noted, however, that under the current language of Rule 56(e), a properly supported motion for summary judgment will be granted if
the non-movant does not rebut the movant's evidence. See id.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee notes (1963).
7. See Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 465. See also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct.
1504 (1985) (credibility determinations as part of a directed verdict should be left to the
finder of fact because of his ability to observe the witness's demeanor).
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the means of guiding the triers of fact to a conclusion where the
evidence is in equipoise. It is this substantive evidentiary standard
that has been the mechanism for factfinders to scrutinize the evidence in different types of cases-whether the persuasion burden
requires a finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence,
clear and convincing evidence, or beyond all reasonable doubt.
Seemingly in contradiction to these traditional propositions,
the Supreme Court of the United States in Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc.,' held in a "public figure" 9 defamation action: summary judgment will lie where the movant demonstrates that the
non-movant cannot show, with convincing clarity, that the movant
acted with actual malice. 10 Perhaps the Court was implicitly at8. 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986), revg Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), rev'g in part, 562 F. Supp. 201 (D.D.C. 1983).
9. The determination of what constitutes a public figure, and the significance of the
term, was established in a line of cases beginning with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). In New York Times, the Court expressed its "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials." 376 U.S. at 270. The Court widened the scope of "public
figure" to encompass individuals beyond the parameters of those in public service. See generally Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (categorizing a football coach as a
limited purpose public figure because he voluntarily placed himself into the public limelight); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 146 (1967) (a former United States Army
general was a public official because "he thrust himself into the 'vortex' of the controversy."). See also Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1293 n.12 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (the issue of whether an individual is a public figure is a question of law to be
resolved by the Court), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898.
The Court was unwilling to extend the public figure-public official category to an attorney working on a controversal murder case in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974). By merely doing his job, the attorney was held not to have thrust himself into the
vortex of a public issue. Id. at 351-52. See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55
(1976) (wife of well-known industrial figure, whose husband held several press conferences
in the midst of a highly publicized divorce, was not a public figure because she did not
thrust herself into the controversy).
In the district court, the Anderson plaintiffs were considered limited purpose public
figures because they were lobbyists. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201, 208
(D.D.C. 1983) (relying on Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th
Cir. 1966)(Blackmun, J.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967)).
10. Actual malice was constitutionally defined as a "statement ... made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (1964). The Court also held that this constitutional standard
must be shown with "convincing clarity" as opposed to the usual preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at 285-86.
The Court emphasized the subjective state of mind requirement noting that "only those
false statements made with the high degree of awarenessof their probable falsity demanded
by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions" in Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (emphasis added). In a later case, the Court was explicit in
distinguishing between a high degree of requisite intent and simple negligence:
[Rieckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
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tempting to give trial courts the impetus to grant summary judgment more liberally in the first amendment area, where even the
threat of a trial may have an undesirable chilling effect on the media." If that rationale were true, however, it would seem that the
Court could have more easily based and more closely tapered its
decision to the first amendment concerns. The Court did not rely
on that line of analysis. Instead, the opinion is based primarily on
the summary judgment procedures. Furthermore, it is readily apparent that summary judgment has often been granted in the first
amendment area since the Court's decision in Hutchinson v.
Proxmire,1 2 where the Court suggested restraint in granting summary judgment in defamation cases. Finally, the unusual13 makeup
of the Court also suggests that Anderson was more a battle over
the standard of proof with respect to summary judgment rather
than a typical first amendment libel case.
In Anderson, the plaintiffs sued columnist Jack Anderson and
others involved in his publication, The Investigator. The action
have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such
doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual
malice.
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
11. In Washington Post Co. v. Keough, Judge Skelly Wright wrote:
In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are even more essential. For
the stake here, if harassment succeeds, is free debate. One of the purposes of the
[New York] Times principle, in addition to protecting from being cast in damages in libel suits filed by public officials, is to prevent persons from being discouraged in the full and free exercise of their First Amendment rights with respect to the conduct of their government. The threat of being put to the defense
of a lawsuit brought by a popular public official may be as chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit itself,
especially to advocates of unpopular causes. All persons who desire to exercise
their right to criticize public officials are not well equipped financially as the
Post to defend against a trial on the merits. Unless persons, including newspapers, desiring to exercise their First Amendment rights are assured freedom from
the harassment of lawsuits, they will tend to become self-censors. And to this
extent debate on public issues and the conduct of public officials will become
less uninhibited, less robust, and less wide open for self-censorship affecting the
whole public is "hardly less virulent for being privately administered."
365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (citation omitted).
12. 493 U.S. 111 (1979). See supra note 15 for a discussion of Hutchinson and the

frequency of summary judgment adjudication in libel cases. See also B.

SANFORD, LIBEL AND

13.3.2.1 nn. 145-48 and accompanying text (citing 31 recent libel cases where summary judgment was granted).
13. It is rare to find Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and Rehnquist aligned
on the same side of a decision. It should be noted that Justice Brennan dissented separately
from the others.
PRIVACY: THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LITIGATION §
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was brought as a result of three articles which profiled the plaintiffs as neo-nazis, anti-Semites, racists, and fascists."' After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, submitting a
plethora of sources in support of the proposition that the articles
were the product of credible and in-depth research--thus removing
them from the bounds of the New York Times actual malice standard. 15 The plaintiffs asserted that some of the main sources relied
on by the author were inaccurate. Further, the plaintiffs relied on
evidence that an editor of The Investigator told the author "that
the articles were 'terrible' and 'ridiculous.' "18
The Anderson Court, finding that the circuit court applied the
wrong standard, held that the standard of proof necessary at trial
is the appropriate mechanism by which motions for summary judgment should be analyzed. In essence, the Court held that the clear
and convincing evidence requirement must be considered by a
court ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a case to which New York
Times applies. Because the court of appeals failed to apply this
standard, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
The Court analogized the standard for summary judgment to
that which a movant would have to meet on directed verdict;" i.e.,
whether a reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice. Although at
first blush Anderson does not seem to establish a new doctrine,
closer analysis reveals the potential for dramatic impact on the
summary judgment rule."8
14. 106 S. Ct. at 2508.
15. See supra note 10 for a discussion of the actual malice standard.
16. Id. at 2509. For a complete discussion of the facts surrounding the cause of action
see infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
17. Id. at 2511.
18. One of the questions this Comment addresses is whether the holding of Anderson
will be as far-reaching as the entire spectrum of summary judgment, or whether it will be
limited to the context in which it arose. A caveat for libel litigants is that summary disposition cannot be underestimated in its bite. Anderson appears to have given the Rule new
teeth. One other potential effect is to deny the advocate the opportunity to wait and see
what might develop at trial.
It must be noted, however, that Anderson is not wholly without supportive precedent in
the lower courts. In Nader v. de Toledano, the court held: "[A] motion for summary judgment should be granted if (1) taking all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, (2) a reasonable juror, acting reasonably could not find for the nonmoving party, (3) under the appropriate burden of proof." 408 A.2d 31, 42 (D.C. 1979) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980). See also Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.) ("[A] judge in denying a defendant's
summary judgment motion must conclude that, based on the evidence asserted in the plaintiff's affidavits, 'a reasonable jury could find malice with convincing clarity.'" Id. at 940
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Applying the burden of proof required at trial on summary
judgment has at least three important ramifications. First, in the
small group of cases which require a heightened evidentiary standard, i.e., clear and convincing evidence, the trial court is now required to apply that standard. It is questionable whether this does
not, in fact, require trial judges to weigh the evidence. 19 Assuming
that the movant's well supported motion for summary judgment
appears to show the non-existence of a material fact, the basic inquiry is no longer whether a jury could return a verdict for the
nonmovant. It now requires asking whether the party with the burden of proof at trial has demonstrated that its evidence is sufficiently weighty that a reasonable jury could find for it with convincing clarity. With this insertion of a new factor in the basic
equation, one must question whether trial judges will have greater
difficulty in ruling on summary judgment motions, or whether
summary judgment analysis will be improved.
(quoting Nader, 408 A.2d at 49), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Guam Fed'n of Teachers
Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying similar reasoning on a motion
for directed verdict); Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Wright,
J., concurring) (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-286). This line of cases appeared
to suggest summary judgment was the rule as opposed to the exception until Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, a case involving the speech and debate clause, clouded the so-called rule. 443 U.S.
111 (1979). In Hutchinson, Senator William Proxmire was sued by the recipient of one of
his illustrious Golden Fleece awards. The Court suggested that:
Considering the nuances of the issues raised here, we are constrained to express
some doubt about the so-called "rule". The proof of "actual malice" calls a defendant's state of mind into question and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition. In the present posture of the case, however, the propriety of
dealing with such complex issues by summary judgment is not before us.
Id. at 120 n.9 (citations omitted). The actual statistics, however, reveal no significant difference in the quantity of summary judgments granted before and after the controversial footnote. Between 1976 and 1980, 75 % of defendant's summary judgment motions were granted.
Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 710-11 n.23 (1984) (citing Franklin, Suing Media for
Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND RES. J. 795, 801-02.) After Hutchinson and
its footnote 9, approximately 75% of defendant's motions for summary judgment were likewise granted. Id. at 711 n.29 (citing Libel Defense Resource Center Study, Summary Judgment in Libel Litigation: Assessing the Impact of Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 4 LIBEL DEF.
RESOURCE CENTER BULL. 2, 2(pt.2) (Oct. 15, 1982)). Hutchinson spawned much speculation
and criticism. See generally Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 710-12 (1984); Note,
Summary Judgment in Defamation Actions: A Threat to the Substantive Rights of Public
Figure Plaintiffs, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (1981); Comment, The Propriety of Granting
Summary Judgment for Defendants in Defamation Suits Involving Actual Malice, 26 VILL.
L. REV. 470 (1980-81); Note, Public Figure Defamation: PreservingSummary Judgment to
Protect Free Expression, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 112 (1980).
19. Anderson seems to require judges to weigh the evidence at summary judgment,
while simultaneously warning judges not to weigh the evidence. 106 S. Ct. at 2519 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). See also infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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Second, and of equally significant impact, Anderson seems to
displace a traditional jury function by requiring the judge to make
an early assessment of the evidence in light of the burden of persuasion.2 The Anderson Court's consideration of the heightened
evidentiary standard at the summary judgment level encroaches on
a traditional function of the jury-in Wigmore's terms, "the risk of
non-persuasion of the jury."21 The Court seems to paint with a
broad brush when it rationalizes that summary judgment "mirrors" directed verdict.2
Third, the Court's mirror metaphor-that the summary judgment inquiry mirrors the directed verdict inquiry-impacts both
on general notions of jury functions as well as problems inherent in
state of mind and credibility cases. Specifically, it seems to increase the capacity to preclude issues encompassing state of mind
and witness credibility from reaching the trial stage, where the
subjective nature of such matters is not readily reducible to tangible evidence. s This seems to fly in the face of the well established
maxim requiring that finders of fact be afforded the opportunity to
assess witness demeanor at trial.2 4
This Comment will address the issues Anderson raises. The
authors are primarily concerned that the Court failed to state
clearly the actual impact of its decision. The authors will also address the impact of the new summary judgment standard on the
jury system. This will take into consideration the early analysis of
the persuasion burden, a function historically within the province
of the jury. Finally, the authors will analyze the potential impact
in state of mind and credibility cases.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Basic Concerns
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been the
victim of inconsistent, confusing, and indefinable federal court jurisprudence from its inception.2 5 The Rule was designed to "dis20. See infra notes 110-131 and accompanying text.
21. 9 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2485 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis added).
22. 106 S. Ct. at 2511.
23. See id. at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of reducing summary judgment to "a full blown paper trial on the merits").
24. See supra notes 3 and 5. See also Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S.
464 (1962) (holding summary judgment is inappropriate in state of mind cases). But see

Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the Summary Judgment Context: A Better
Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 774 (1983) (strongly criticizing Poller).
25. See Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 465.
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pos[e] of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact"2 6 by a summary judgment. In 1946, the Rule was
amended to allow adjudication on the issue of liability and to determine the amount of damages at trial.27 In 1963, the Rule was
once again amended to resolve a problem which arose in the Third
Circuit because of that Circuit's insistence of allowing the non-movant to stand on his "well-pleaded '28 complaint. The Advisory
Committee expressly addressed the issue, stating that "[tihe very
mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genu29
ine need for trial.
Summary judgment illustrates the inherent tension between
the competing goals of efficiency and fairness-the values embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.30 The trial judge needs
the mechanism to dispose of disputes which need not be resolved
at trial, thus committing only those judicial resources necessary to
that level of dispute resolution. In contrast, the judge must not
infringe on the litigant's right to his day in court before a jury of
his peers..1 In the realm of media-defendant defamation cases,
The summary judgment procedure under Rule 56 is plagued by confusion and
uncertainty. It suffers from misuse by those lawyers who insist on making a motion in the face of obvious fact issues; from neglect by others who, fearful of
judicial hostility to the procedure, refrain from moving even where summary
judgment would be appropriate; and from the failure of trial and appellate
courts to define clearly what is a genuine issue of material fact.

Id. (footnote omitted); F.

JAMES

& G.

HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE

207 (3d ed. 1985) (Sum-

mary judgment has fallen far short of its potential to terminate controversy in which there
is no substantial disagreement on the evidence: "This is because, as the procedure is generally administered, (1) the party against whom the motion is made has not been rigorously
required to 'put up or shut up' in its contentions as to the facts; and (2) a 'genuine issue of
material fact' is regarded as presented if there is the 'slightest doubt' as to what the facts
are."); Louis, supra note 15, at 708-15; Sonenshein, supra note 21, at 774-75 (summary judgment has failed to achieve its goal because of uncertainty in application); see also supra
note 3.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note (1938 amendments).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) advisory committee's note (1946 amendments). The changes
were prompted by doubts expressed in Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620
(1944).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) 1963 advisory committee's note.
29. Id. The Committee went on to state "[wihere the evidentiary matter in support of
the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be
denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented." Id. See also Adickes v. Kress,
398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
31. The Constitution of the United States provides: "In Suits at common law where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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judges must also consider the goals embodied in the first amendment. Therefore, the trial judge must balance concerns of efficiency, the right to trial by jury, and general notions of free speech.
Confusion has generally reigned over the determination of
what constitutes a genuine issue of material fact.3 2 In the mediadefendant defamation action, part of the confusion has been
grounded on the evidentiary standards and burdens to be applied
at the summary judgment level. It is the Court's apparent attempt
to remedy the confusion and the potential for greater confusion as
a result of the new standards which is at the center of this Comment's analysis.
B. Special Concerns: State of Mind, Credibility, and Clear and
Convincing Evidence
1.

STATE OF MIND AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT JURISPRUDENCE

Factual questions requiring determination of a litigant's subjective state of mind or credibility have always occupied a peculiar
position in summary judgment adjudication. Where a case turns on
the subjective intent of a party, great deference has been given to
permitting the factfinders to view the demeanor of witnesses. This
concern is closely related to the historically strong value our judicial system has placed on the jury-especially where an ultimate
fact 3 3 hinges on personal credibility. Moreover, evidence of such
matters is not always easily reducible to a tangible state.3 4 The
Court has struggled to develop applicable standards for tackling
the difficult problem of when to take a "state of mind" case from
the jury.
In Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,35 the Su32. See supra note 17.
33. Ultimate facts are those which are mixed questions of law and fact and present the
most difficult determinations for a trial court. See Baumgartner v. United States, 322 .U.S.
665, 760-71 (1944); see also Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 470.
34. It should be noted, however, that the defendant's state of mind in the media defendant defamation context has been held to be discoverable. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153 (1979).
35. 368 U.S. 464 (1962). In Poller, a private antitrust action, a television station owner
claimed that CBS illegally conspired to eliminate his business. The district court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of four affidavits, all of whom
were interested parties-high ranking CBS officials. Id. at 468. The affidavits all went to the
state of mind of the relevant actors. In response, the plaintiff rested on the bare assertion
that the defendants intentionally engaged in a conspiracy to unfairly compete with and undermine his business. Id. at 478-79 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, pointing to the considerations which accompany cases heavily reliant on the
state of mind of a party.
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preme Court stated that summary judgment
should be used sparingly ... where motive and intent play
leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when
the witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that
their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can
be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury
36
which so long has been the hallmark of "evenhanded justice.
The broad language quoted above invited lower courts to proceed
with utmost caution in adjudicating issues similar to those present
in Poller. The net result has been a long adhered to practice of
denying motions for summary judgment where state of mind is at
issue, even where movants have come forward with tangible evidence to support the motion, thereby defeating an underlying pre37
mise of the summary judgment rule.
In First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 38 the
Court reached the opposite result as in Poller.The Court let stand
a summary judgment in an extremely lengthy and complex antitrust case, pointing to the necessity of coming forward with sufficient evidence to defeat an otherwise well supported motion for
summary judgment.3 9 In so doing, the Court merely reaffirmed
what had long been the basic standard for summary judgment
36. 368 U.S. at 473 (footnotes omitted).
37. One of the standards developed as a result of this doctrine is the "slightest doubt"
test employed primarily by the Second Circuit which "seems to ask whether the opposing
party could conceivably develop a prima facie case at trial, notwithstanding the strength of
the moving party's proof." Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 761 (1974). See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir.
1970) ("A litigant has a right to a trial where there is the slightest doubt as to the facts
Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir.
. .")(quoting
.
1945); Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United Rubber Workers v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
38. 391 U.S. 253 (1968). The Court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that he could rest
on his allegations rather than come forward with evidence which would have rejected the
movant's contentions on the non-existence of a conspiracy. Id. at 289. At the time of the
Court's decision, the case had been embroiled in many years of discovery. Although the
question presented an issue of fact, the conspiracy issue was also one of law. The judge was
therefore entitled to make a legal determination of whether the facts presented would legally support the inference of conspiracy the plaintiff alleged.
39. Cities Service, 391 U.S. at 2S9.
While we recognize the importance of preserving litigants' rights to a trial on
their claims, we are not prepared to extend those rights to the point of requiring
that anyone who files an antitrust complaint setting forth a valid cause of action
be entitled to a full-dress trial notwithstanding the absence of any significant
probative evidence tending to support the complaint.
Id. at 290. This is seemingly analogous to the problem as it arises in the media defendant
defamation case.
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adjudication.' 0
2.

DEFAMATION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND THE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING STANDARD

The issue of deciding when a case should not proceed to the
jury has also been prevalent in the realm of defamation suits. Prior
to Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,"1 two' general approaches to
summary adjudication of defamation suits have been developed in
the lower state and federal courts. The first approach requires that
the judge ascertain whether the plaintiff can meet the actual malice standard without regard to the heightened evidentiary standard
required at trial. Under this approach, the trial judge would consider the evidentiary burden at the directed verdict stage of the
litigation.' The second approach applies the clear and convincing
40. This is not to say that the Court reached an opposite result from Poller because it
did not give deference to the state of mind concerns. Conversely, the primary concern rested
with the plaintiff's failure to respond to the defendant's well supported motion for summary
judgment with any evidence in light of the lengthy pre-trial period and the plaintiff's opportunity to conduct the necessary discovery. In effect, the plaintiff was unable to show the
existence of any external evidence to support his conspiracy allegations. Furthermore, both
the plaintiff and defendant's interests were virtually the same with respect to the transaction at issue. Cities Service, 391 U.S. at 280.
The Supreme Court revisited summary judgment in Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398
U.S. 144 (1970). Adickes was a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) action brought by a white woman
who was allegedly refused service at the defendant's restaurant because she was with six
young black students. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment stating that there was "no evidence in the complaint or in the affidavits and other
papers from which a 'reasonably-minded' person might draw an inference of conspiracy." Id.
at 153 (quoting 252 F. Supp. at 144). The Supreme Court, however, found summary judgment improper because the "respondent [Kress] failed to carry its burden of showing the
absence of any genuine issue of fact." Id. Thus, according to the Adickes Court, the initial
burden of disproving the existence of a fact issue rests with the movant and, in that case, it
never became incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove more at the summary judgment stage.
41. 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
42. The authors suggest that there have been two basic approaches to resolution of
summary judgment motions in media defendant defamation cases. One court has suggested,
however, that there are three approaches. See Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 42 (D.C.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980). The second and third tests suggested by the Nader court seem to be based on semantic and, perhaps, technical differences and appear to
mesh into one approach when considering the major features of the cases cited therein.
43. Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970). In Wasserman, Judge Skelly Wright suggested a twoprong approach to early disposition of defamation cases; the first at the summary judgment
stage, and the second at the close of the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff would first have to
convince the trial judge at the summary judgment stage that he could make out a case in
the light of the New York Times actual malice standard. Id. at 922-23. The second prong of
Judge Wright's test requires the trial judge to direct a verdict for the defendant at the close
of the plaintiff's case if she were convinced that the plaintiff failed to prove his case with
clear and convincing evidence. Id. See also Nader, 408 A.2d at 46 (listing cases following the
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evidence requirement at all stages of the litigation. Thus, instead
of making one inquiry at summary judgment and a different inquiry at directed verdict, the second approach requires evenhanded application of the heightened evidentiary standard.4 "
Regardless of the approach one takes, these approaches provide special evidentiary problems regarding the state of mind, motive, intention, and credibility issues as they arise at the summary
judgment level. Further, courts must make distinctions between direct and inferential evidence of these subjective factors. A court
may be forced to use external factors as indicia of one's internal
subjective state. A tension is thus created between the concerns of
allowing such factors to be determined by the factfinders and the
need for summary disposition of non-meritorious claims.
III.

ANDERSON v. LIBERTY LOBBY, INC.

A.

The Facts

Liberty Lobby, Inc., a not for profit corporation, is a "citizen's" lobby headquartered in Washington D.C. It operates "with
an avowed purpose to advocate and promote 'patriotism, nationalism, lawfulness, protection of the national interests of the United
States and the economic interests of its citizens, and strict adherence to the United States Constitution and the form of government it establishes.' "5 Liberty Lobby publishes the Spotlight, a
Wasserman approach).
44. See Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). The Nader court suggested that there were two
distinct approaches taken with respect to the second position discussed here.
In Nader, the court referred to the "neutral" approach. The so-called "neutral" approach, as presented in Guam Federation of Teachers, Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974), holds that summary judgment analysis should
remain the same with one major exception. The sole supplemental factor is that the clear
and convincing evidentiary standard, required in media defendant defamation cases, should
also be applied. Nader, 408 A.2d at 47. This approach was taken by the Supreme Court in
Anderson. 106 S. Ct. at 2512.
The third summary approach taken in media defendant defamation cases, according to
the Nader court, was that of the Supreme Court of Washington in Chase v. Daily Record,
Inc., 83 Wash. 2d 37, 515 P.2d 154 (Wash. 1973). The court there adapted a test under
which
[tihe trial judge at the summary judgment stage determines that the plaintiff
has offered evidence of a sufficient quantum to establish a prima facie case, and
the offered evidence can be equated with the standard or test of "convincing
clarity" prescribed by United States Supreme Court decisions, the motion for
summary judgment should be denied.
83 Wash. 2d at 43, 515 P.2d at 157-58 (footnotes and citations omitted).
45. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201, 205 (D.D.C. 1983).
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weekly national newspaper which is circulated to approximately
335,000 paid subscribers.4 It also produces a daily radio commentary, "This is Liberty Lobby," aired on over 460 stations. 7 The
organization also produces a weekly television newscast broadcast
on thirty stations. 8
Willis A. Carto is Liberty Lobby's founder, treasurer, and
chief lobbyist.'9 He and his organization were the subject of a series of articles written by Charles Bermant and edited by Jack Anderson.5 The articles appeared in the October, 1981 issue of The
Investigator, a Jack Anderson publication. 5 1 Bermant relied on various sources, including many major national periodicals, such as
The Washington Post, The Washington Star, The Los Angeles
Times, William Buckley's The National Review, and True Magazine in writing his article. He also relied on sources such as the
Congressional Record, and publications of the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith.52 Bermant also gathered information from
over 1000 pages of documents obtained through the Freedom of
Information Act.53
The focus of the Investigator articles was Carto's history of
involvement in the dissemination of anti-Semitic and other racist
materials under the guise of furthering the principles embodied in
the Constitution. 5 4 The articles recounted some of the many suspect ideological positions advocated by Carto. In "Yockey: Profile
of an American Hitler," Bermant alluded to Carto's introduction
to Francis Parker Yockey's book Imperium.5 5 In that introduction,
Carto wrote:
The Jew is a product of another Culture ....
This basic fact
kept the Jew entirely separate from the West spiritually and racially-the West rejected his world-feeling, he rejected its. Mutual hatred and mutual persecution only strengthened the Jewish race, sharpened its cunning and increased its resentment.
Thus, the Negro in general rejects the white race, and the white
rejects the Negro. The culture barrier is also present, for the Negro is below our culture even though he has lived within its area
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 206. IMPERIUM is currently marketed and sold by Liberty Lobby. Id.
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for centuries. "'
Quoting from the Congressional Record, on which Bermant also
relied:
An outspoken anti-Semite who has professed an abiding admiration for Hitler and Nazi Germany and has been the moving
force behind a network of Jew-hating organizations and publications over the years is also the unpublicized force behind "This
is Liberty Lobby," an extremist radio program carried five times
a week by some 126 stations around the country. [His name is
Willis A. Carto .. .57].
Bermant also relied on the opinion of Winfred Scott Stanley,
Jr., the editor of two John Birch Society publications, who "stated
that it was indeed his view that Carto was anti-Semitic and, in
addition, racist." 58 Additionally, Bermant relied on an article
which appeared in True Magazine (True), in November 1969, written by Joseph Trento and Joseph Spear entitled: "How Nazi Nut
Power Has Invaded Capitol Hill."59 Liberty Lobby sued True for
defamation, but ultimately settled out of court.6 0 The settlement
included money and publication of a favorable article about Liberty Lobby in True. 1
Spear was also The Investigator's Managing Editor, who assigned Bermant the task of writing the Liberty Lobby articles.2
Bermant's detailed appendix to his affidavit" lists the Trento and
Spear article as a source for some of Bermant's allegations.6 The
court of appeals pointed out that Bermant also relied on the testimony of Robert Eringer, a freelance journalist, as a major source,
even though Bermant had never met Eringer and had "only one
telephone conversation with him."6 " Judge Scalia pointed out that
this virtually anonymous, unverified source was reminiscent of the
56. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting F. YOCKEY, IMPERIUM 311-13 (1962)).
57. Id. at 205 (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. E4841 (daily ed. July 18, 1974) (remarks of Rep.
Eilberg)).
58. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201, 204 (1983).
59. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1566 (1984). At the time the True
article was published, Trento and Spear worked for Anderson. Id. n.3.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1567. Bermant submitted a lengthy affidavit in support of his motion for
summary judgment that included a detailed list of over 100 sources which he used in researching the articles.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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6
Supreme Court's hypothetical in St. Amant v. Thompson,"
which
was similarly "based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone
67
call."
Carto and Liberty Lobby brought a libel action against Anderson, Bermant, and others in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. 8 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants acted with
actual malice6 9 in writing and publishing the articles. 70 After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the theory that there existed no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether they acted with actual malice. 71 In granting the defendants' motion, the district court relied on Wasserman v. Time,
Inc., which reasoned that the New York Times standard should
be applied at the summary judgment level. 3
The court of appeals reversed as to nine counts of the complaint, and affirmed as to twenty-one.7 4 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that it was inappropriate to apply
the New York Times standard at the summary judgment level,
reasoning that:

Imposing the increased proof requirement at this stage would
change the threshold summary judgment inquiry from a search
for a minimum of facts supporting the plaintiff's case to an evaluation of the weight of those facts and (it would seem) of the
weight of at least the defendant's uncontroverted facts as well.
It would effectively force the plaintiff to try his entire case in
pretrial affidavits and depositions-marshalling for the court all
the facts supporting his case, and seeking to contest as many of
the defendant's facts as possible. Moreover, a "clear and convincing evidence" rule at the summary judgment stage would
compel the court to be more liberal in its application of that
provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) . . . Finally, if summary judgment were supposed to be based on a "clear and convincing"
standard, it is hard to explain the Supreme Court's statement
questioning the asserted principle that in public figure libel
cases "summary judgment might well be the rule rather than the
66. 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (distinction between requisite intent of actual malice and
simple negligence).
67. Id. at 732.
68. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201 (D.D.C. 1983).
69. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
70. 562 F. Supp. at 201.
71. Id. at 204.
72. 424 F.2d. 920, 922 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940
(1970).
73. Id.
74. 106 S. Ct. at 2509.
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exception," and affirming to the contrary that "[t]he proof of
'actual malice'.., does not readily lend itself to summary
disposition." 5
The Supreme Court rejected Judge Scalia's well-reasoned decision and reversed and remanded the case. In so doing, the Court
ruled that "the determination of whether a given factual dispute
requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive
evidentiary standards that apply to the case."'7 6 The Court went on
to state that this holding, as one would logically conclude, is applicable at both the directed verdict and summary judgment stages.77
As a consequence, the Court concluded that "where the New York
Times 'clear and convincing' evidence requirement applies, the
trial judge's summary judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine
issue exists will be whether the evidence presented is such that a
jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for
either the plaintiff or the defendant. 7 8 Thus, trial courts must apply the clear and convincing evidentiary standard at the summary
judgment level.
B.

The Court's Analysis

In holding that the evidentiary standard required at trial is
applicable at the summary judgment stage, the Court's reasoning
turned on the essence of the summary judgment inquiry. The inquiry of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact requires
analysis of the substantive law to ascertain whether a fact is material.79 Next, the trial judge must determine whether the issue is
genuine8 0 A determination of the genuineness of an issue requires
questioning whether "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."8' 1 "The inquiry
performed is the threshold determination of whether there is a
need for a trial. In other words, the court must inquire as to
whether there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be
resolved in favor of either party."8' 2
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Andcrzon, 746 F.2d at 1570 (citation omitted).
106 S. Ct. at 2514.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2510.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2511.
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The next logical step suggested by the Court requires analysis
of genuineness in light of the standard of proof. The Court reasoned that ascertaining how "genuine" an issue is depends on the
substantive evidentiary burden one must meet at trial. If the party
with the burdens of proof and production cannot come forward
with evidence of a character sufficient that a reasonable jury could
find in his favor, then the issue is not sufficiently genuine for submission to the jury, and must be decided as a matter of law. This
effectively forecloses one from getting to the trial stage where there
is no possibility for a jury to find for the plaintiff.
The Court also stated that this evidentiary inquiry mirrors the
standard for directed verdict. 83 It is this common rationale which
underlies the Court's reasoning and justification: "the trial judge
must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but
one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict."'8 ' The Court went on
to state that "[ilf reasonable minds could differ as to the import of
the evidence, however, a verdict should not be directed."85 Thus, if
evidence has been presented, or documented in the case of a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must determine
whether a reasonable jury could find for either party. Where the
evidence permits more than one reasonable inference, and thus differing conclusions, the case must be submitted to the jury because
the issue of fact is genuine. Thus, because the court of appeals
failed to use the appropriate evidentiary standard, the Supreme
Court remanded for analysis in light of that standard.
The dissenting opinions reflect two differing concerns with the
opinion of the Court. Justice Brennan 6 is primarily concerned
with the heightened evidentiary burden imposed at the summary
judgment stage of the litigation. The central focus of his dissent is
the Court's discussion of precluding a case from going to the jury
83. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
84. 106 S. Ct. at 2511 (citing Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943))
(emphasis added).
85. Id. (citing Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 62 (1949)) (emphasis added). The
analogy to the directed verdict standard is not without precedent: "summary judgment
should be granted where the evidence is such that it 'would require a directed verdict for
the moving party.'" Id. at 2512 (quoting Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 624
(1944)). See also Bieghler v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1980) (summary judgment
should be granted where the moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict based on
the evidence in support of the motion); Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980) (summary judgment should be granted
where it is clear the movant would be entitled to a directed verdict); Neely v. St. Paul Fire
and Marine Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1978) (where it is clear that at summary
judgment the movant is entitled to directed verdict, summary judgment should be granted).
86. 106 S. Ct. at 2515-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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where the evidence is "so one-sided." 8 Moreover, Justice Brennan
is concerned that there is no precedent for the proposition that the
evidentiary standard required at trial be applied at the summary
judgment level.8 8 Justice Brennan expressed concern that the standards espoused by the Court would "transform what is meant to
provide an expedited 'summary' procedure into a full blown paper
trial on the merits."" Finally, he questioned the practical effect of
the Court's decision. His concern was whether the quantity of evidence will now determine the genuineness of an issue.90 To that
end, Justice Brennan questioned whether in a case where one
party produces 100 witnesses and the other party only one witness,
does the overwhelming quantity necessarily mean that "the evidence [is] 'so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law?'

"91

Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger,
viewed the Court's decision as "a procedural requirement engrafted onto Rule 56, contrary to [the Court's] statement in Calder
v. Jones.' 9 2 Justice Rehnquist points out the Court's decision in
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 3 where the Court expressed the im87. Id. at 2516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. "As far as I can discern, this conclusion, which is at the heart of the case, has been
reached without the benefit of any support in the case law." Id.
89. Id. at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Justice Brennan suggests the following hypothetical in a breach of contract case:
[Tihe defendant moves for summary judgment and produces one purported eyewitness who states that he was present at the time the parties discussed the
possibility of an agreement, and unequivocally denies that the parties ever
agreed to enter into a contract, while the plaintiff produces one purported eyewitness who asserts that the parties did in fact come to terms, presumably that
case would go to the jury. But if the defendant produced not one, but 100 eyewitnesses, while the plaintiff stuck with his single witness, would that case,
under the Court's holding, still go to the jury?
Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. Justice Brennan also expressed concern over the effect of the trial judge determining whether the evidence, documented at summary judgment, satisfies the substantive
evidentiary burden.
[W]hether evidence is 'clear and convincing,' or proves a point by a mere preponderance, is for the factfinder to determine. As I read the case law, this is how
it has been, and because of my concern that today's decision may erode the constitutionally enshrined role of the jury, and also undermine the usefulness of
summary judgment procedure, this is how I believe it should remain.
Id. See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
92. Id. at 2520-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984)). In Calder, the Court stated: "We have already declined in other contexts to grant
special procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to
the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws." Id. at 2521 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91).
93. 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985).

http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol4/iss1/6

18

Goodman and DuBosar: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby: A New York "State of Mind"

ANDERSON v. LIBERTY LOBBY

19871

portance of the trial judge's assessment of the demeanor of witnesses in the context of a bench trial.9 Justice Rehnquist further
expressed grave doubt as to the workability of this seemingly new
summary judgment standard at the trial court level.9e
IV.

ANDERSON

ON REMAND: APPLICATION AND CONCERNS

The Anderson majority reversed and remanded the case because the court of appeals did not apply the proper standard in
reviewing the district court's order granting summary judgment.
The nine allegations at issue on appeal must now be reviewed
under the New York Times clear and convincing standard. Applying this criteria to the substantive evidentiary burden Liberty
Lobby must shoulder at trial, one may analyze the potential outcome on remand.
A.

The Facts Against the Background of the
New Standard

Under the standard enunciated by the Anderson Court, the
facts must be reassessed so as to determine "whether a fair-minded
jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence
presented" against the clear and convincing evidentiary standard."
The majority warns that "at the summary judgment stage the
judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.""8 In undertaking to analyze Anderson
under the Court's standard, query whether it does not actually
When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52 demands even greater deference to the trial court's findings; for
only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice
that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what is said.
Id. at 1512 (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985)).
94. 106 S. Ct. at 2521 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. "Instead of thus illustrating how the rule works, [the majority] contents itself with
abstractions and paraphrases of abstractions, so that its opinion sounds much like a treatise
about cooking by someone who has never cooked before and has no intention of starting
now." Id.
96. At the inception of Liberty Lobby's action, the plaintiffs made out thirty allegations of defamation, two of which were illustrations. The district court, in granting summary
judgment, dismissed all thirty. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201, 210
(D.D.C. 1983). On appeal, the circuit court reviewed each of the thirty allegations and
agreed with the district court's order as to twenty-one; however, it reversed on the other
nine, finding there to be genuine issues of material fact. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson,
746 F.2d 1563, 1577-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
97. 106 S. Ct. at 2512.
98. Id. at 2511.
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mandate weighing the evidence. 9
The nine allegations at issue on appeal are easily subdivided
into four categories. The first deals with the allegation that Carto
bilked Liberty Lobby contributors out of money.10 0 The second
deals with the defendants' alleged characterization of Carto as an
advocate of forced repatriation of black Americans to Africa.' 01
The third set of allegations were those based solely on the True
magazine article, the validity of which was at the heart of previous
litigation.102 Finally, the remaining allegations arose out of the sole
conversation with Robert Eringer-a source whose credibility was
03
admittedly not a concern of Anderson.1
The inquiry for each of these counts is whether a jury could
reasonably find clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.
The possible inferences one might draw from these facts would
probably be sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact in a
mere "preponderance of the evidence" case. The current inquiry
requires more; it is now necessary that the possible inferences are
supported by clear and convincing evidence. The court of appeals
stated that "[ilt is for a jury to determine the truth or falsity of
these matters and whether, if false, they are defamatory.' 1 04 Under
Anderson, the initial inquiry avoids the law-fact distinction problem and focuses on the question of whether a jury must resolve the
issue. 0 5 In each instance, adjudication is dependent on the characterization of evidence as to whether it satisfies the clear and con99. See The Supreme Court-LeadingCases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 100, 255 (1986) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
100. In allegation 11 of its complaint, Liberty Lobby alleged that the article implied
Carto, as chairman and owner of the Government Education Foundation (GEF), rented a
building owned by GEF to Liberty Lobby for $6,000 per month. The article asserted that
Carto raised the money for the building through an urgent appeal to Liberty Lobby constituents. The obvious implication was that Carto was helping himself, under the guise of helping Liberty Lobby. In fact, no such figures were contained in the cited authority. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 746 F.2d at 1577.
101. The sources revealed, as Judge Scalia indicated, that Carto advocated only a voluntary repatriation program. Although Scalia found either scheme "repugnant," he nevertheless expressed that there is a difference between the two and that the allegation regarding forced repatriation could be viewed as defamatory. Id. at 1577-78.
102. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 155-60.
103. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 746 F.2d at 1578-79. The record further revealed that Anderson and Bermant never made any attempt to meet Eringer to assess his reliability. Id.
104. Id. at 1577.
105. See Leading Cases, supra note 99, at 256. For an informative discussion of the
law-fact distinction problem as it arises in the context of summary judgment see Schwarzer,
supra note 3, at 469-80; see also Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867 (1966).
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vincing standard.106
Analyzing the potential outcome on remand points out the obvious shortcoming of the Anderson standard: it is difficult to determine what to do and how to do it. There is the initial problem of
determining what is, qualitatively and quantitatively, clear and
convincing evidence. Even assuming that there is an objective
standard of what constitutes clear and convincing evidence, it appears that what would be a genuine issue of material fact in a simple preponderance case would not be a genuine issue in the clear
and convincing case. Thus, there seems to be a great capacity for
disparity in analysis of motions for summary judgment. Moreover,
difficulty arises because in the defamation context, especially in
close cases, state of mind, credibility, and demeanor questions are
at the heart of the inquiry. The Anderson approach becomes even
more difficult in light of the Court's admonition that the trial
judge is not to weigh the evidence. It would appear that the very
10 7
inquiry suggested is necessarily one of weighing the evidence.
Justices Brennan and Rehnquist expressed concern over the
potential disparity and indeterminacy of the Anderson rule in
their dissents. Justice Rehnquist observed:
The primary effect of the Court's opinion today will likely be to
cause the decisions of trial judges on summary judgment motions in libel cases to be more erratic and inconsistent than
before. This is largely because the Court has created a standard
that is different from the standard traditionally applied in summary judgment motions without even hinting as to how its new
standard will be applied to particular cases."'8
Justice Brennan, echoing Justice Rehnquist's concerns, stated that
106. It might be suggested that summary judgment should be denied as to all the
allegations, because taken together, the defendant's deficiencies would permit a finding of
actual malice. The above facts, taken in the aggregate, could allow a reasonable jury to find

by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants acted with the requisite disregard for
the truth.
107. As Justice Brennan stated in dissent:
I simply cannot square the direction that the judge "is not himself to weigh the
evidence" with the direction that the judge also bear in mind the "quantum" of
proof required and consider whether the evidence is of sufficient "caliber or
quality" to meet that "quantum." I would have thought that a determination of
the "caliber and quality," i.e., the importance and value, of the evidence in light
of the "quantum," i.e., amount required could only be performed by weighing
the evidence.
106 S. Ct. at 2519 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2520-23 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of the problem of weighing the evidence as it relates to allocating burdens, see 9 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2487 (3d ed. 1940).
108. 106 S. Ct. at 2523 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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"the mess [the Court] make[s] is not, in the first instance, our own
to deal with; it is the district courts and courts of appeals that
must struggle to clean up after us." 1 9
B.
1.

Unpersuasive Use of the Burden of Proof

PREMATURE CONSIDERATION OF THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION

A problem less obvious than the concern over the negative
practical impact of Anderson exists at a more theoretical level. At
issue is the allocation of the burden of proof. Anderson seems to
make the summary judgment inquiry go beyond the question of
whether the plaintiff has met its production burden sufficient to
require a trial; it also goes to the persuasion burden. The production burden exists from the inception of the litigation and requires
the bearer of the burden to produce sufficient evidence on all relevant aspects of the case from which a jury can return a verdict in
its favor. " The persuasion burden is borne by the party who must
persuade the factfinders1" of his position. The standards for measuring the satisfaction of the burden differ based on the substantive nature of the case." 2 Hence, in the garden-variety negligence
case the level of persuasion must be by a preponderance of the
evidence, whereas the public figure plaintiff in a media defendant
defamation action must persuade with clear and convincing
evidence.1 13
It is the Court's apparent mandate to assess the persuasion
burden at the summary judgment stage which is problematic. It
appears that the majority reaches this conclusion by looking both
to questions of sufficiency of evidence, as noted in precedent, and
by comparing the nature of the summary judgment inquiry with
that of the directed verdict. It is perhaps here that the Court
causes a fundamental shift in summary judgment jurisprudence
without directly addressing this aspect of its holding. Although
there is much support for analogizing the "taking the case from the
jury" concerns at both summary judgment and directed verdict, it
109. Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.7. (3d ed. 1985) (citing J. THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 376 (1898); MORGAN, SOME
PROBLEMS OF PROOF 73 (1956)).
111. It must be noted that the judge makes initial determinations to control the jury
by setting the standards by which they must be persuaded. The first inquiry, of course, is
whether the case should proceed to or be taken from the jury.
112. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 110, at §§ 7.6, 7.7.
113. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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is quite another matter to conduct the analytical inquiries as if the
case had progressed to the same point in both.
Until Anderson, it appeared to be basic hornbook law that the
persuasion aspect of the burden of proof went to the factfinders'
assessment of the evidence so as to derive what the facts might
be."" The measure or standard imposed by the test was to guide
the factfinders in their mission to ascertain the facts. Whether evidence satisfies the persuasion burden has traditionally been within
the province of the factfinders, based on the judge's instructions. " 5
As Justice Brennan pointed out in Anderson: "whether evidence is
'clear and convincing,' or proves a point by a mere preponderance,
is for the factfinders to determine.""'
The majority relied on precedent in support of the proposition
that the substantive evidentiary burden was implied at the summary judgment stage. Specifically, the Court cited Adickes v.
Kress1 7 and First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service
Co." ' In analyzing both cases the Court determined that Rule 56
requires a court to determine whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact. Yet, in so stating, the Court failed to explain how it
divined this standard of applying the substantive evidentiary burden at summary judgment. The shortcoming emanates from the
Court's failure to distinguish between the two components of the
burden of proof, thus leading to differing analytical results.
2.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTED VERDICT: THE MIRROR IMAGE

The Petitioners suggest, and we agree, that this standard [summary judgment] mirrors the standard for directed verdict under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial
judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there
can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, however, a verdict should not be directed." 9
A major component of the Anderson Court's analysis was the
discussion of the correlation of the basic inquiry at both summary
114. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 110, at §§ 7.6, 7.7.
115. Id. at 315.
116. 106 S. Ct. 6t 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded: "As I
read the case law, this is how it has been, and because of my concern that today's decision
may erode the constitutionally enshrined role of the jury, and also undermine the usefulness
of summary judgment procedure, this is how I believe it should remain." Id.
117. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
118. 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
119. 106 S. Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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judgment and directed verdict. 120 Each procedure is concerned
with the underlying question of whether a case should proceed to
the jury, or whether the evidence is such that the judge may decide
the case as a matter of law. 1 ' At the directed verdict stage, it is
plausible that the substantive evidentiary standard required at
trial is applicable because the evidence has matured to the form in
which it would go to the jury. Therefore, the relevance of the persuasion burden in passing on a motion for directed verdict is apparent. As a result, the Court's use of the "mirror metaphor," i.e.,
that the standard for summary judgment mirrors that of directed
verdict, suggests that the summary judgment inquiry mirrors that
of Rule 50(a) in every way. Therefore, the Court concluded, "the
inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or
for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the
'
merits."122
It is unquestionable that the basic underlying inquiry of directed verdict and summary judgment is the same. Thus, the mirror metaphor is generally, as a matter of procedure, accurate. The
concern in both procedures is when a case should properly be
taken from a jury. The Court has much support for its proposition
that the inquiries have historically been the same. 23 The phraseology has always been geared to whether "a reasonable jury could
find," "whether there is but one conclusion," and as suggested in
Anderson, "whether it [the evidence] is so one-sided."' 2 Although
this basic inquiry has been the same, it is questionable whether a
cold record on a motion for summary judgment should be tested
against the substantive evidentiary standard applicable at trial.
One cannot escape the fact that the nature of the evidence at
the two different motions is not the same. At the directed verdict
stage, the witnesses, whose credibility may have been at stake,
have been questioned and cross-examined in open court. Exhibits
have been entered into evidence, and have been brought into perspective with the assistance of live persons. All this is quite different from the cold record. In consideration of these factors, a dis120. It should also be noted that analysis of the directed verdict inquiry is the same as
that on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The authors have limited references to directed verdicts for purposes of expediency.

121. See 101 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL
2713.1 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter FEDERAL PROCEDURE].
122.
123.
124.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

106 S. Ct. at 2512.
See FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 121, at § 2713.1.
106 S. Ct. at 2512.
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tinction has been drawn between what a judge may consider in
ruling on either motion. At the summary judgment stage, the judge
may not rule on the credibility of the evidence, whereas the judge
may consider whether a witness is or is not believable in view of
his presence in court. 1 5 In light of the stage of the case's maturity,
it would appear that the directed verdict inquiry should implicate
the substantive evidentiary burden. The case is as it would be submitted to the jury, and thus a judge should analyze it in the same
manner that a jury would be instructed to so do. These considerations, of course, are based on a type of evidence very distinct from
the paper evidence before the judge at summary judgment. Such
evidence is not of the type, then, which should be considered at the
higher substantive level.
This analysis also implicates basic jury concerns and the value
our society places on the jury system. The Court's insistence that
the summary judgment and directed verdict procedures mirror
each other is not inaccurate. The metaphor is not, however, entirely representative of the litigation process. The basic inquiry, as
previously discussed, is identical. The Court, however, should not
have pressed for a pure use of the mirror image because of the
difference in the maturity of the case at the time of the two procedures. The persuasion burden should be a means of analysis
strictly within the province of the jury.12 6 It is the triers of fact
who should be guided by the substantive evidentiary standard so
as to resolve the case in which the evidence is in equipoise.12 7 In
the final analysis, the use of the substantive evidentiary burden at
the summary judgment level will not only impede on a traditional
jury function, it will also increase the capacity for judicial error.
3.

THE UNDERLYING JURY CONCERN

A concern underlying much of the discourse between the ma125. On a summary judgment motion the court is not permitted to rule on the
credibility of the material that is presented. When there is an issue whether the
testimony of an affiant or deponent would be credible if presented at trial, the
court must deny summary judgment and leave that question to be resolved by
the finder of fact. However, a directed verdict motion typically would be made
after the witness had testified and the court could take account of the possibility
that he either could not be disbelieved or believed by the jury.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 121, at § 2713.1.
126. But cf. McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden
of Persudosion, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1382, 1383 (1955) ("It [burden of production] describes the
risk of nonpersuasion of the judge that the burden of persuasion of a reasonable jury may
have been fulfilled.")
127. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 110, at 314.
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jority and the dissents is the issue of when a case should go to the
jury. This also brings to light the difficulties of resolving law-fact
distinctions and the respective roles of the judge and the jury.'28
Great value has been placed on the traditional role of the jury in
our system of justice. 12 9 But, as Justice Brennan expressed, the effect of Anderson may be to "erode the constitutionally enshrined
130
role of the jury.'
Anderson raises the seventh amendment concern because it
seemingly gives the trial judge more power to adjudicate the merits
of the case without allowing the plaintiff the opportunity to present his case to the jury. In many ways it usurps the traditional
role of the jury and gives it to the judge. This appears to be the
natural and probable result of having the judge examine the evidence in light of the burden of persuasion-a duty traditionally in
the province of the jury.' 3 ' Thus, while enunciating procedural
doctrine, the Court's decision may have serious constitutional
ramifications.
V.

CONCLUSION

After Anderson, it is clear that the non-movant must not only
meet the traditional Rule 56(e) burden of coming forward to show
a genuine issue of material fact, but must also do so in congruence
with the requisite trial standard of proof. Thus, if the standard of
proof required at trial is one of clear and convincing evidence, the
evidence presented in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must also satisfy such an evidentiary burden.
The Court's opinion has the appearance of neatness in its
analysis of the similarities between the summary judgment and directed verdict inquiries. One is lulled into what may be a false
sense of security, feeling comfortable with the conclusion that it
only makes sense to apply the same substantive evidentiary burden at different stages of the litigation. After all, both are geared
at keeping the meritless case from going to the jury. Applying the
same standard of proof at each stage forces the party with the burden of proof at trial to come forward with his case so that the trial
128. See generaly Weiner, supra note 105. It would appear that what was previously
characterized as being an issue for the judge or an issue for the jury may no longer be as
easily distinguishable.
129. For an informative discussion of the history of the seventh amendment see Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337-56 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130. 106 S. Ct. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
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judge may correctly assess it before wasting the court's and litigant's time in a frivilous trial. Both procedures are a means of
maintaining systematic efficiency and protecting litigants from
having to defend unsubstantiated claims. In the end, the rule of
efficiency embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 will be
satisfied. Efficiency, however, is not the only goal embodied in that
Rule.
Beyond the neat analysis laid out in the Court's opinion are
some disturbing results. The Court seems to have undercut certain
basic assumptions of our procedural system. The persuasion burden has traditionally been a standard by which the triers of fact
make factual findings. The effect of Anderson is to usurp the
factfinder's function, and require the judge to weigh the evidence
at an early stage of the litigation. Unlike the directed verdict stage,
the judge must rule without the benefit of having viewed witness
demeanor, and observing the complete trial develop. Consideration
of the substantive evidentiary burden at directed verdict is acceptable in that the evidence has matured to the level at which the
case would be submitted to the jury. The nature of the evidence in
a cold record at the summary judgment stage, however, does not
mirror the nature of the evidence at the directed verdict stage.
Anderson was the perfect case for the Court to reaffirm its
commitment to protecting media defendants in a public figure defamation action. Since New York Times v. Sullivan, it has been
clear that such cases are disfavored actions. There are strong constitutional reasons which mandate this result. It is also clear from
Anderson that the Court is concerned that trial judges have generally been hesitant to grant summary judgment. Thus, one should
not be surprised that the Court sought to send a message in the
form of this case. The Court did not, however, limit its opinion to
the obvious considerations before it. Instead, it set out on a course
of altering the basics of summary judgment jurisprudence. There
are several potential results. If Justice Rhenquist is correct, the
Court's new standard may lead to more confusion than already exists. The authors are less concerned that Anderson may be a new
procedural rule for the benefit of media defendants, for that would
be in harmony with the first amendment values at play. The authors are more concerned, however, with the potential deleterious
effect the Court's holding will have on the right to jury trial "preserved" by the seventh amendment.
It may well be that the Court needed to send a message to
trial courts that summary judgment is an essential mechanism for
weeding out meritless claims. Such a message is certainly in line
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with many of the numerous policy considerations at play. Stating a
policy and radically transforming a procedural mechanism are two
different matters, especially when the reformulation of the procedural mechanism necessarily impinges on equally valued goals.
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